Intimate partner violence is an important problem that has significant detrimental effects on the wellbeing of female victims. The chronic physical and psychological effects of intimate partner violence are complex, long-lasting, chronic, and require treatments focusing on improving mental health issues, safety, and support. Various psycho-social intervention programs are being implemented to improve survivor wellbeing. However, little is known about the effectiveness of different treatments on IPV survivors' wellbeing. For this purpose, we conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis to assess (...) the effectiveness of interventions on improving outcomes that describe the wellbeing of adult female survivors of IPV. We searched PubMed, PsycINFO, and Cochrane Library. We explored the effectiveness of available interventions on multiple outcomes that are critical for the wellbeing of adult female victims of IPV. To provide a broad and comprehensive view of survivors' wellbeing, we considered outcomes including mental health, physical health, diminishing further violence, social support, safety, self-efficacy, and quality of life. We reviewed 2,770 citations. Among these 25 randomized-controlled-study with a total of 4,683 participants met inclusion criteria. Findings of meta-analyses on interventions indicated promising results in improving anxiety [standardized mean difference −7.15, 95% confidence interval −8.39 to −5.92], depression, safety, violence prevention, health, self-esteem, social support, and stress management at the post-test. We found that empowerment plays a vital role, especially when treating depression and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, which are difficult to improve across interventions. We found mixed findings on self-efficacy and quality of life. The effects of IPV are long-lasting and require treatments targeting co-morbid issues including improving safety and mental health issues. (shrink)

Early life stress precedes alterations to neuro-immune activation, which may mediate an increased risk for stress-related psychiatric disorders, potentially through alterations of central kynurenine pathway metabolites, the latter being relatively unexplored. We hypothesized that ELS in a non-human primate model would lead to a reduction of neuroprotective and increases of neurotoxic KP metabolites. Twelve adult female bonnet macaques reared under conditions of maternal variable foraging demand were compared to 27 age- and weight-matched non-VFD-exposed female controls. Baseline behavioral observations of social (...) affiliation were taken over a 12-week period followed by the first cerebrospinal fluid sample. Subjects were then either exposed to a 12-week repeated separation paradigm or assigned to a “no-RSP” condition followed by a second CSF. We used high-performance liquid chromatography for kynurenine, tryptophan, 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid, kynurenic acid, and anthranilic acid as a proxy for quinolinic acid determination. At baseline, social affiliation scores were reduced in VFD-reared versus control subjects. CSF log KYNA and log KYNA/KYN ratio were lower in VFD-reared versus control subjects. CSF log KYNA/KYN was positively correlated with CSF log ANTH in VFD only. Controlling for log KYNA/KYN, log ANTH was elevated in VFD-reared subjects versus controls. CSF log KYNA/KYN obtained post-RSP was positively correlated with mean social affiliation scores during RSP, specifically in VFD. ELS is associated with a reduced neuroprotective and increased neurotoxic pathway products. That the two contrasting processes are paradoxically correlated following ELS suggests a cross-talk between two opposing KP enzymatic systems. (shrink)

Contributions in the concept of the divine; influence; Islamic philosophy.

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 7, July 2022.

Sharīf Kāshānī, Ḥabīb Allāh, -1921 or 1922 ; Persian poetry- 20th century ; Sufi poetry, Persian- 20th century.

Three of the articles included in this issue of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy - Ron Amundson and Shari Tresky's "On a Bioethical Challenge to Disability Rights"; Rachel Cooper's "Can It Be a Good Thing to Be Deaf?"; and Mark T. Brown's "The Potential of the Human Embryo" - interact (in various ways) with the concepts of disability, humanity, and personhood and their normative dimensions. As one peruses these articles, it becomes apparent that terms like "disability," "human being," (...) and "person" carry with them great normative significance. There is, however, much disagreement concerning both the definition and the extension of such terms. This is significant because different terms and definitions are associated with different sets of normative requirements. In what follows we reconstruct the argument of each of the articles, and then offer some brief critical analysis intended to stimulate further thought about and discussion of the issues that each raises. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been an increase in the adoption of Shari’a in Europe and North America as an arbitration protocol for the resolution of potential contractual disputes. In a largely secular Western business environment, this reality raises corporate policy implications for business organizations. In particular, questions are raised about whether Shari’a is by nature too unpredictable—and too dismissive of women’s rights—to be properly and ethically permitted by Western companies as a possible dispute resolution alternative. This article (...) examines the dynamics and factors that are involved as corporate managers decide whether Shari’a arbitration ought to be banned entirely from contractual negotiations. Arguments for and against the inclusion of a Shari’a arbitration clauses in commercial contracts and contract negotiations are presented. The article concludes that while managers should exercise great prudence and consider the moral implications of negotiating arbitration clauses, an organizational ban of the use of faith-informed arbitration generally, or Shari’a in particular, would be neither morally required nor optimally serve the interests of the organization or its stakeholders. (shrink)

al-mujallad al-awwal. al-Qayim al-īmānīyah wa-al-qiyam al-ijtimāʻīyah -- al-mujallad al-thānī. al-Qiyam al-akhlāqīyah -- al-mujallad al-thālith. -- al-Qiyam al-siyāsīyah wa-al-idārīyah wa-al-qiyam al-iqtiṣādīyah -- al-mujallad al-rābiʻ. al-Qiyam al-ʻilmīyah wa-al-qiyam al-ṣiḥḥīyah wa-al-bīʼah wa-al-qiyam al-wajdānīyah wa-al-jamālīyah.

al-Juzʼ al-awwal. al-Taʼsīs al-Qurʼānī al-muʻāṣir li-ʻilm uṣūl al-fiqh al-muqāran, dirāsah istiqrāʼīyah fī al-manjhaj wa-al-athar al-qānūnī -- al-Juzʼ al-thānī. Handasat al-insān al-qānūnī, dirāsah iṭārīyah fī mutatāliyat al-muthul wa-taṭwīʻ al-insān al-muntaẓim -- al-Juzʼ al-thālith. Tiknūlūjyā al-taʻāẓum al-insānī, ruʼyah fikrīyah iṭārīyah fī al-handasah wa-ṣināʻat al-insān al-qānūnī -- al-Juzʼ al-rābiʻ. al-Lā yaqīn al-ẓarfī, dirāsah fī al-masārāt al-falsafīyah al-ʻilmīyah wa-al-qānūnīyah lil-zamakān -- al-Juzʼ al-khāmis. Lughat ṣināʻat al-naṣṣ al-qānūnī, dirāsah fī al-naẓarīyah wa-al-taṭbīq -- al-Juzʼ al-sādis. Ibtikār al-manhaj al-qānūnī bayna al-usus al-ʻilmīyah wa-al-taṣawwurāt al-naẓarīyah wa-al-ʻilmīyah -- al-Juzʼ (...) al-sābiʻ. al-istidlāl al-istiqrāʼī li-qānūn al-mustaqbal fī al-nānū tiknūlūjī -- al-Juzʼ al-thāmin. Naẓarīyāt muʻāṣirah fī ḍawʼ al-manhaj al-Sanhūrī lil-ʻalāqah al-baynīyah lil-qānūn wa-al-sharīʻah -- al-Juzʼ al-tāsiʻ. al-Ḥayāh al-shakhṣīyah wa-al-mawt, naẓarāt qānūnīyah falsafīyah fī al-mafhūm, al-tamyīz, al-miʻyār -- al-Juzʼ al-ʻāshir. Falsafat al-qānūn fī ʻālam al-ḥadāthah wa-mā baʻda al-ḥadāthah. (shrink)

Commentary on Quwaysinī's commentary on Akhḍarī's work titled the Sullam al-muawraq on logic.

Total quality; commerce; economics; religious aspects; Islam; Islamic ethics.

Sadr al-Sharīʿah (d. 747/1346) is one of the theologians representing the later period of the Māturīdī kalām. He based his system of thought on his criticisms of Avicenna, al-Rāzī, and Ṭūsī. His criticism of these names stems from his own understanding of being. He thinks differently from the theologians of the later period on issues such as the essence-existence division, the superaddition of existence to essence, and the acceptance of mental being, which are accepted by the majority of theologians of (...) the later period. His understanding of being in question also influenced his analysis of the idea of the wahdat al-wujūd. In the study, some aspects of the framework proposed by Muhammed Bedirhan will be given first. Then, in order to make sense of Sadr al-Sharīʿah’s criticism of wahdat al-wujūd, the major understandings of wahdat al-wujūd will be summarized briefly, and finally, Sadr al-Sharīʿah’s analysis of wahdat al-wujūd will be examined and clarified using Bedirhan’s framework. Although the framework has subheadings, it classifies criticisms into two categories: rationally-based and sharʻī-based objections. Rational objections are directed from the traditions of kalām and philosophy, while sharʻī-based objections come from Salafi thinkers, faqihs, and sufis. The framework is comprehensive in classifying criticisms against the theory of wahdat al-wujūd. This framework will clarify Sadr al-Sharīʿah’s approach, and the source of his criticisms should be identified. According to Bedirhan, the sufis’ theory is in conflict with the members of other schools in two aspects, practical and theoretical. While the first one considers sufism a religious state (ḥal), the second one is the point that shapes the view of other intellectual groups on sufism in terms of the fact that sufism is also a science. Bedirhan has based the theoretical conflict part of his framework on the triple classification of al-Jābiri: burhān, beyān and irfān. According to al-Jābiri’s classification, sufism, which is included under the title of irfān, deals with the previous two traditions mentioned. However, burhan and beyan traditions also offer their criticisms of the epistemological and ontological acceptances of the irfān tradition. Behind the criticism of the traditions of thought towards each other is the claim that the metaphysical theory of the opposite group is insufficient. According to the presented framework Sadr al-Sharīʿah’s criticisms can be considered within not only the kalām tradition but also the sufi tradition, because he is a sufi who accepts ittihād as one of the “sayr sulūk” degrees. Sadr al-Sharīʿah’s explains two proofs by which sufis defend their metaphysical theory, and also presents a counter-proof based on the verbal commonality of sense knowledge and being. He also aims to point out the weakness of the metaphysical theory of sufis with the view that the idea of ittihād is unique to a certain degree. By mentioning Sadr al-Sharīʿah’s criticisms and explanations of wahdat al- wujūd, the study identifies Sadr al-Sharīʿah’s stance on the rational and sharʻī-based objections. (shrink)

Arabic translation Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī'l letter on logic translated by the recipient, his son, Ibn al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī.

Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Thānī al-Maḥbūbī (d. 747/1346) was the last major Māturīdī theologian of Transoxania. As he left no work of rational theology (kalām) proper, one of the chief sources of his theological thought is his book on legal theory, al-Tawḍīḥ fī ḥall ghawāmiḍ al-Tanqīḥ. Because the work served as a prominent reference for both legal theory and rational theol­ogy, an extensive commentary tradition on it emerged as it was transmitted from Transoxania to South Asia, Anatolia, and the Arab world. A (...) distinctive subfield of this commentary tradition consisted of glosses devoted exclusively to one specific section of al-Tawḍīḥ. Revolving around the nature of good and evil, and intimately linked to the question of human free will, this part of Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa’s text came to be treated as a separate work, commonly referred to as al-Muqaddimāt al-arbaʿ (“The four pro­legomena”). Due to its role as a highly sophisticated refutation of late Ashʿarī doctrine on human volition, al-Muqaddimāt al-arbaʿ eventually developed into a prime source for later Māturīdī scholars in their discussion of human volition and related topics. (shrink)

Post-classical period witnessed intense debates on aspects of the Avicennan theory of science. Among them one set of discussions concerned the issue of subject matter (mabāhith al-mawdūʿ) in a science. They were raised by Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa (d. 747/1346) in the introduction of his al-Tawḍīh, a commentary on his legal theory text al-Tanqīḥ. Therein, he raised three questions: (1) whether the subject matter of a science can be multiple, (2) what restricting subject matter of a science means, and (3) whether one (...) thing can be the subject matter of multiple sciences. Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390), a proponent of the Avicennan theory, objected to Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa’s positions in his al-Talwīḥ, the most well-known supercommentary on al-Tawḍīh. The paper analyzes this debate on the issue of subject matter in sciences, and thus sheds light on the reception of an important aspect of the Avicennan theory of science in the postclassical period. (shrink)

This article is concerned with two distinct corporeal logics. In the first, corporeality is founded on joints, tendons, and mobility; in the second, the envelope and its apertures are considered primordial. The first logic is extant in very few works. Although these texts (e.g. The Iliad, Beowulf) clearly share the same, very specific, conception of the body, they belong to different histories. The corporeal logic of the 'jointed body' (corps articulaire) cannot, therefore, be appraised in terms of longue durée. The (...) texts represent, instead, a moment of transition between the psychodynamics of orality and literacy. A problem correlated to this fact is that readers (ancient and modern) no longer think using the same logic as that pertaining to the jointed body. They tend to translate information regarding the logic of the jointed body into data meaningful in their own logic. (shrink)

Dâwûd al-Qarisî (Dâvûd al-Karsî) was a versatile and prolific 18th century Ottoman scholar who studied in İstanbul and Egypt and then taught for long years in various centers of learning like Egypt, Cyprus, Karaman, and İstanbul. He held high esteem for Mehmed Efendi of Birgi (Imâm Birgivî/Birgili, d.1573), out of respect for whom, towards the end of his life, Karsî, like Birgivî, occupied himself with teaching in the town of Birgi, where he died in 1756 and was buried next to (...) Birgivî. Better known for his following works on Arabic language and rhetoric and on the prophetic traditions (hadith): Sharḥu uṣûli’l-ḥadîth li’l-Birgivî; Sharḥu’l-Ḳaṣîdati’n-nûniyya (two commentaries, in Arabic and Turkish); Şarḥu’l-Emsileti’l-mukhtalifa fi’ṣ-ṣarf (two commentaries, in Arabic and Turkish); Sharḥu’l-Binâʾ; Sharḥu’l-ʿAvâmil; and Sharḥu İzhâri’l-asrâr, Karsî has actually composed textbooks in quite different fields. Hence the hundreds of manuscript copies of his works in world libraries. Many of his works were also recurrently printed in the Ottoman period. One of the neglected aspects of Karsî is his identity as a logician. Although he authored ambitious and potent works in the field of logic, this aspect of him has not been subject to modern studies. Even his bibliography has not been established so far (with scattered manuscript copies of his works and incomplete catalogue entries). This article primarily and in a long research based on manuscript copies and bibliographic sources, identifies twelve works on logic that Karsî has authored. We have clarified the works that are frequently mistaken for each other, and, especially, have definitively established his authorship of a voluminous commentary on al-Kâtibî’s al-Shamsiyya, of which commentary a second manuscript copy has been identified and described together with the other copy. Next is handled his most famous work of logic, the Sharhu Îsâghûcî, which constitutes an important and assertive ring in the tradition of commentaries on Îsâghûcî. We describe in detail the nine manuscript copies of this work that have been identified in various libraries. The critical text of Karsî’s Sharhu Îsâghûcî, whose composition was finished on 5 March 1745, has been prepared based on the following four manuscripts: (1) MS Kayseri Raşid Efendi Kütüphanesi, No. 857, ff.1v-3v, dated 1746, that is, only one year after the composition of the work; (2) MS Bursa İnebey Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Genel, No.794B, ff.96v-114v, dated 1755; (3) MS Millet Kütüphanesi, Ali Emiri Efendi Arapça, No. 1752, ff.48v-58r, dated 1760; (4) MS Beyazıt Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Beyazıt, No. 3129, ff.41v-55v, dated 8 March 1772. While preparing the critical text, we have applied the Center for Islamic Studies (İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi, İSAM)’s method of optional text choice. The critical text is preceded by a content analysis. Karsî is well aware of the preceding tradition of commentary on Îsâghûcî, and has composed his own commentary as a ‘simile’ or alternative to the commentary by Mollâ Fanârî which was famous and current in his own day. Karsî’s statement “the commentary in one day and one night” is a reference to Mollâ Fanârî who had stated that he started writing his commentary in the morning and finished it by the evening. Karsî, who spent long years in the Egyptian scholarly and cultural basin, adopted the religious-sciences-centered ‘instrumentalist’ understanding of logic that was dominant in the Egypt-Maghrib region. Therefore, no matter how famous they were, he criticized those theoretical, long, and detailed works of logic which mingled with philosophy; and defended and favored authoring functional and cogent logic texts that were beneficial, in terms of religious sciences, to the seekers of knowledge and the scholars. Therefore, in a manner not frequently encountered in other texts of its kind, he refers to the writings and views of Muhammad b. Yûsuf al-Sanûsî (d.1490), the great representative of this logical school in the Egyptian-Maghrib region. Where there is divergence between the views of the ‘earlier scholars’ (mutaqaddimûn) like Ibn Sînâ and his followers and the ‘later scholars’ (muta’akhkhirûn), i.e., post-Fakhr al-dîn al-Râzî logicians, Karsî is careful to distance himself from partisanship, preferring sometimes the views of the earliers, other times those of the laters. For instance, on the eight conditions proposed for the realization of contradiction, he finds truth to be with al-Fârâbî, who proposed “unity in the predicative attribution” as the single condition for the realization of contradiction. Similarly, on the subject matter of Logic, he tried to reconcile the mutaqaddimûn’s notion of ‘second intelligibles’ with the muta’akhkhirûn’s notion of ‘apprehensional and declarational knowledge,’ suggesting that not much difference exists between the two, on the grounds that both notions are limited to the aspect of ‘known things that lead to the knowledge of unknown things.’ Karsî asserts that established and commonly used metaphors have, according to the verifying scholars, signification by correspondence (dalâlat al-mutâbaqah), adding also that it should not be ignored that such metaphors may change from society to society and from time to time. Karsî also endorses the earlier scholars’ position concerning the impossibility of quiddity (mâhiyya) being composed of two co-extensive parts, and emphasizes that credit should not be given to later scholars’ position who see it possible. According to the verifying scholars (muhaqqîqûn), it is possible to make definition (hadd) by mentioning only difference (fasl), in which case it becomes an imperfect definition (hadd nâqis). He is of the opinion that the definition of the proposition (qadiyya) in al-Taftâzânî’s Tahdhîb is clearer and more complete: “a proposition is an expression that bears the possibility of being true or false”. He states that in the division of proposition according to quantity what is taken into consideration is the subject (mawdû‘) in categorical propositions, and the temporal aspect of the antecedent (muqaddam) in hypothetical propositions. As for the unquantified, indefinite proposition (qadiyya muhmalah), Karsî assumes that if it is not about the problems of the sciences, then it is virtually/potentially a particular proposition (qadiyya juz’iyyah); but if it is about the problems of the sciences, then it is virtually/potentially a universal proposition (qadiyya kulliyyah). This being the general rule about the ambiguous (muhmal) propositions, he nevertheless contends that, because its subject (mawdû‘) is negated, it is preferable to consider a negative ambiguous (sâliba muhmalah) proposition like “human (insân) is not standing” to be a virtually/potentially universal negative (sâliba kulliyyâh) proposition. He states that a disjunctive hypothetical proposition (shartiyya al-munfasila) that is composed of more than two parts/units is only seemingly so, and that in reality it cannot be composed of more than two units. Syllogism (qiyâs), according to Karsî, is the ultimate purpose (al-maqsad al-aqsâ) and the most valuable subject-matter of the science of Logic. For him, the entire range of topics that are handled before this one are only prolegomena to it. This approach of Karsî clearly reveals how much the ‘demonstration (burhân)-centered’ approach of the founding figures of the Muslim tradition of logic like al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ has changed. al-Abharî, in his Îsâghûjî makes no mention of ‘conversion by contradiction’ (‘aks al-naqîd). Therefore, Karsî, too, in his commentary, does not touch upon the issue. However, in his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd Karsî does handle the conversion by contradiction and its rules. Following the method of Îsâghûjî, in his commentary Karsî shortly touches on the four figures (shakl) of conjuctive syllogism (qiyâs iqtirânî) and their conditions, after which he passes to the first figure (shakl), which is considered ‘the balance of the sciences’ (mi‘yâr al-‘ulûm), explaining the four moods (darb) of it. In his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd, however, Karsî handles all the four figures (shakl) with all their related moods (darb), where he speaks of fife moods (darb) of the fourth figure (shakl). The topic of ‘modal propositions’ (al-muwajjahât) and of ‘modal syllogism’ (al-mukhtalitât), both of which do not take place in the Îsâghûjî, are not mentioned by Karsî as well, either in his commentary on Îsâghûjî or in his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd. Karsî proposes that the certainties (yaqîniyyât), of which demonstration (burhân) is made, have seven, not six, divisions. After mentioning (1) axioms/first principles (awwaliyyât), (2) observata/sensuals (mushâhadât), (3) experta/empiricals (mujarrabât), (4) acumenalia (hadthiyyât), (5) testata (mutawâtirât), and (6) instictives (fitriyyât), that is, all the ‘propositions accompanied by their demonstrations,’ Karsî states that these six divisions, which do not need research and reflection (nazar), are called badîhiyyât (self-evidents), and constitute the foundations (usûl) of certainties (yaqîniyyât). As the seventh division he mentions (7) the nazariyyât (theoreticals), which are known via the badîhiyyât, end up in them, and therefore convey certainty (yaqîn). For Karsî, the nazariyyât/theoreticals, which constitute the seventh division of yaqîniyyât/certainties, are too numerous, and constitute the branches (far‘) of yaqîniyyât. Every time the concept of ‘Mughâlata’ (sophistry) comes forth in the traditional sections on the five arts usually appended to logic works, Karsî often gives examples from what he sees as extreme sûfî sayings, lamenting that these expressions are so widespread and held in esteem. He sometimes criticizes these expressions. However, it is observed that he does not reject tasawwuf in toto, but excludes from his criticism the mystical views and approaches of the truth-abiding (ahl al-haqq), shârî‘â-observant (mutasharri‘) leading sufis who have reached to the highest level of karâmah. (shrink)

This anthology takes a broad approach to ethics, incorporating traditional topics and texts while bringing in voices and themes that are too often excluded. A substantial section on ethical theory is provided, as are readings on topics such as oppression, sex, identity, the environment, life and death, war and terror, and caring for others. Accessible introductions and discussion questions are included throughout to contextualize material for the student reader without playing favorites among the positions at issue.

While Ralph Waldo Emerson has been increasingly acknowledged as an American thinker influential in the evolution of nineteenth-century philosophy, his essays have largely failed to escape the charges of quietism and political apathy bestowed upon them in his lifetime. Yet if Emerson insisted on the importance of silence to the antislavery movement, it was perhaps due to his theory that one's deepest obligations become involuntarily part of the self and thus refuse to withstand representation in direct speech. My article reads (...) Emerson's writing in this light, suggesting more broadly that the common notion that silence and politics are antithetical be reconsidered with regard to the possibility that what constitutes political speech need not be explicit — or even vocal. (shrink)

This anthology offers a fresh approach to the ethics of business, casting a critical eye on entrenched assumptions and practices. It includes central works from such thinkers as John Locke, Karl Marx, Milton Friedman, Naomi Klein, and Thomas Piketty, while also introducing new voices on a range of pressing practical topics, including racial discrimination in the workplace, factory farming, climate change, affirmative action, and whistleblowing. A truly applied anthology, this book encourages students to see the real-world applications of the theories (...) at issue and to examine the consequences of business as usual. (shrink)